July 6, 1863 Clashes at Hagerstown and Williamsport Chronicled

By Carl L. Sell Jr. · Originally published July 2020 · pp. 22–23

July 6, 1863 Clashes at Hagerstown and Williamsport Chronicled by Carl L. Sell Jr. Not enough has been written about it, but the Civil War cavalry activities in and around Hagerstown, Md., on Sunday, July 6, 1863, were extremely important to the Confederate effort to leave Pennsylvania after the Battle of Gettysburg. Union cavalry threatened Confederate wagons lined up along the Potomac River at Williamsport, Md., waiting for high water to subside so they could cross and reach safety on the Virginia side. A thin defense line made up of the Eighteenth Virginia Cavalry, the Sixty-Second Virginia Mounted Infantry, and the Virginia Partisan Rangers, backed by wagon drivers and walking wounded, as well as 23 cannon, helped Brigadier General John Imboden repulse an attack by Union Brigadier General John Buford and his cavalry. The Eighteenth Virginia Cavalry was led by Colonel George W. Imboden, the general’s son. Earlier during the retreat, the younger Imboden saved his father from capture near Greencastle, Penn. Colonel George H. Smith led the Sixty-Second while the Virginia Partisan Rangers were headed by Captain H. H. McNeill. Meanwhile Union riders under Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick occupied Hagerstown, just six miles to the north. The two Union brigadiers met earlier that day on the Boonsboro Road and planned a two-pronged attack on the Confederate wagon train. Kilpatrick was full of himself, having claimed the destruction of Ewell’s wagon train at Monterrey Pass the night of July 4-5. Officers under Brigadier General George Custer said they were able to penetrate Ewell’s train, destroying and capturing many wagons full of supplies and wounded. However, they were not able to prevent the bulk of Ewell’s wagons from reaching the river. Imboden said: “At the end of this long day of desultory fighting and harassment, the train was rolling into Williamsport, having lost only a handful of wagons to the enemy.” After replenishing ammunition near Frederick early on July 6, Buford pushed westward toward Williamsport. Along the way he met Kilpatrick, who had broken contact with General Jeb Stuart’s cavalry at Smithsburg the previous evening. Kilpatrick led his column north toward Hagerstown before planning to join Buford at nearby Williamsport and destroy the Confederate wagons before the bulk of the Southern infantry would arrive. Stuart did not leave the Gettysburg area until July 5, opting to wait out heavy rain the previous night. His force was depleted by battle losses, tired horses, and low ammunition. In his absence, Kilpatrick passed through Emmitsburg and attacked the Confederate wagon train before the Confederate cavalry got underway. Stuart sent two brigades under Major General Fitzhugh Lee to guard the flank of the wagons using the Cashtown Road. Stuart and the rest of the command rode into Emmitsburg on the morning of July 5, then continued on a circuitous route through the Catoctin and South Mountain passes. He didn’t catch up with Kilpatrick until that night in Smithsburg. After a short artillery duel, Kilpatrick retreated toward the Boonsboro Road. That same night, Stuart sent a courier to General Lee, moved his force toward Leitersburg, where he received a reply and information from scouts the following morning. According to his report, Stuart was convinced Kilpatrick had moved toward Boonsboro, so he planned to position himself between the Yankees and the retreat route. Stuart sent Colonel John Chambliss and Brigadier General Beverly Robertson’s brigades toward Hagerstown. Shortly thereafter, he learned that Kilpatrick was moving westward along the Boonsboro Road and elements of his command had occupied Hagerstown. Stuart ordered brigades led by Brigadier General William (Grumble) Jones and Colonel Milton Ferguson, along with artillery, toward the town.

Ferguson was filling in for Brigadier General Jenkins, who had been wounded July 2. Stuart wrote about his thoughts at that point in his report: “I felt sure that the enemy’s designs were directed against Williamsport, where, I was informed by General Jones, our wagons were congregated in a narrow space at the foot of a hill, near the river, which was too much swollen to admit their passage to the south bank. “I therefore urged on all sides a most vigorous attack to save our trains at Williamsport. Our force was very perceptibly much smaller than the enemy’s, but by a bold and determined attack, with a reliance of that help which has never failed me, I hoped to raise the siege of Williamsport, if, as I believed that was the real object of the enemy’s designs. “Hagerstown is six miles from Williamsport, the country in between being almost entirely cleared, but intersected by innumerable fences and ditches.” When a regiment from Colonel Chambliss’ brigade approached Hagerstown, it was attacked by several Union regiments, according to Colonel Richard Lee Tuberville Beale, the commander of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry. The Tenth Virginia Cavalry made the first contact, then retreated north of town where a contingent of Confederate infantry was posted behind a stone fence. Cavalrymen with carbines were ordered to dismount and join the infantrymen and drive the enemy from the town. The Confederate infantry, according to Stuart’s report, was part of a North Carolina brigade under the command of Brigadier General Alfred Iverson Jr. The North Carolinians had been badly mauled, losing 900 killed on July 1. The Federals at Hagerstown were led by Colonel Nathaniel P. Richmond, who took command of the Third Cavalry Division’s First Brigade after Brigadier Elon Farnsworth had been killed near Big Round Top on July 3. Fighting raged house to house and on the grounds of churches and cemeteries in the town until Federals from the First West Virginia Cavalry charged up Main Street. It was met by a volley from the Confederate infantry, then charged by cavalry, and driven into a nearby field and captured. The Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry then occupied Main Street. The Fifth New York and First Vermont Cavalry also were involved in the fight with the former suffering “significant” casualties. Some of the First Vermont, who fought as sharpshooters, were cut off; they sought refuge in nearby houses of Union sympathizers, who outfitted them in civilian clothes. Legend has it that Private Antipas Curtis of Company D tipped his hat to General Lee as he subsequently marched through town. General Stuart arrived on the scene late in the afternoon and immediately organized an attack south of town with the Tenth and Thirteenth Virginia regiments in the lead. After about a mile, Federal guns placed on the crest of a hill began firing. Colonel Beale reported that Lieutenant James Kendall Ball and Sergeant Richard Washington, one of three grandnephews of George Washington in the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, were in the lead. “Upon nearing the summit, and not over twenty paces from the muzzle of the guns, the last charge of canister, before escaping from the net of wire which enclosed it, struck one of our men in front, who reeling, fell heavily to the ground,” Beale wrote. Thinking his son (Lieutenant Richard Channing Beale) had been shot; Colonel Beale stopped and unloaded his pistol at the Federal line. Stuart went to the head of the column, got his men all pointed in the right direction, waved his sword and hollered “Charge.” The Yankees retreated toward Williamsport before turning eastward toward Boonsboro along with Buford’s command. Colonel Beale returned to the spot where he thought his son had been shot and found instead that it was Sergeant Washington who lay dead in the arms of his weeping brother, Lawrence. Colonel Beale ordered his son to see that the remains of his fallen comrade were taken across the river and back to Westmoreland County. During the early fighting, Captain Ulrich Dahlgren of the Eighteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, the son of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, was wounded in his right leg; that was eventually amputated. He recovered and was killed early the next year during the controversial “Dahlgren Raid” that focused on capturing Richmond and eliminating the Confederate high command. Captain Nathaniel Rollins of the Second Wisconsin Infantry was among Union prisoners being taken south after being captured when Confederates overran the Iron Brigade on July 1. He kept a diary of his activities during the war, including while in captivity. Rollins was 31 years old at the time and spent the rest of the war at Richmond’s Libby Prison. Six weeks after his release, he wrote a book about his experiences in prison. At Hagerstown, he described General Lee as he passed the prisoners: “Genl. Lee rode past an hour since. He is quite gray, wearing full beard, appears dignified and self possessed. His salute was very elegant and soldier like. He certainly has the external appearance of a general. He wore a blue loose coat and a black hat. Sits finely on his horse. His face indicates high living.” At Williamsport, cavalry units headed by Fitzhugh Lee broke through Union lines and reinforced Imboden’s makeshift line of defense. The Confederate brigadier had fooled the Union advance by constantly shifting troops from one side of the line to the other to make it appear he was stronger than he was. Despite the high water, Imboden disclosed that the Confederates had been able to get two wagon loads of ammunition across the river, adding to his firepower for both artillery and those serving as infantrymen. General Lee assigned several batteries of artillery to Imboden’s wagon train guardians in an effort to stymie Union attacks. Imboden had at his command eight guns of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans led by Major Benjamin F. Eshleman, six headed by Captain John H. McClanahan, and four each led by Captains James F. Hart and Captain W. A. Tanner. A Whitworth long-range cannon team from Hart’s Battery was led by Colonel William (Willie) Ransom Johnson Pegram. In addition to wagon loads of sick and wounded, the lineup included thousands of prisoners, captured horses, forage for the animals and food for the troops. It was the last of a steady stream of captured supplies that flowed back to Virginia during the Gettysburg campaign. Confederate records show just how effective Lee’s efforts to resupply his army from the rich Pennsylvania countryside turned out to be. Imboden lauded three wounded Confederate officers for their help in organizing walking wounded and wagon masters into an effective defensive arrangement. They were Colonel John Logan Black, First South Carolina Cavalry, artilleryman Captain James F. Hart, also from South Carolina, and Colonel William Aylett of the Fifty-Third Virginia Infantry. Aylett, a grandson of Patrick Henry, was wounded during the cannonade prior to Pickett’s Charge. He recovered and was captured April 6, 1865, at Sailor’s Creek. Black was ordered by General Lee to organize stragglers and what he called “game-legged cusses and wagon rats” for the defenses on July 6. He was recovering from typhoid fever. Hart’s guns, normally with Stuart’s Horse Artillery, were attached to A. P. Hill’s Third Corps on July 2 and 3. In addition to the constant threat of attack and construction of defensive earthworks, the troops were subject to unsanitary conditions caused by dead horses and cattle. Private Isaac Baker of the Eighteenth Virginia Cavalry said many of his comrades were felled by disease and had to be evacuated along with the wounded. Two flatboats were available, allowing Imboden to send those wounded across the river who indicated they could walk to Winchester. In his report, Brigadier General Buford said his forces had drove in the enemy’s pickets and made preparations to capture Williamsport, “The enemy was driven handsomely to within a half mile of his trains, at the town, when he came out strong enough to prevent our further progress.” He said that General Wesley Merritt’s brigade was on the right, Colonel William Gamble’s brigade on the left, and Colonel Thomas Devin’s brigade was on the left rear as reserve. “The enemy made an attack on Gamble,” Buford wrote, “but was driven back to its stronghold.” He also said the enemy “attempted to turn our right,” but also was driven back. Just before dark, Kilpatrick’s troops gave way and passed to Buford’s rear. “The expedition had for its object the destruction of the enemy’s trains, supposed to be at Williamsport. This, I regret to say, was not accomplished. The enemy was too strong for me,” Buford concluded. He said that the Confederates were “severely punished” for their obstinacy and “his casualties were more than quadruple mine.” The Sixth Michigan Cavalry reported that it had been ordered to the front at Hagerstown on July 6, but upon arriving there, General Custer, having driven the enemy, ordered them back. That same day, they were engaged with the enemy at Williamsport and “were the last to leave the field, protecting our guns and holding the enemy in check while the remainder of the command fell back toward Boonsboro.” At the end of the day, General Imboden maintained his position at Williamsport, buoyed by the arrival of Fitz Lee and his cavalry. As more infantry arrived over the next few days, the Confederates dug defensive positions between Williamsport and Falling Waters. Stuart’s troopers bivouacked on the Boonsboro Road west of Hagerstown on the night of July 6. The next day Stuart began to advance units toward the Federal lines. They encountered Federals led by General Buford at a bridge over Beaver Creek, just west of Boonsboro. The ground was too muddy for horses, so all the fighting occurred on foot. Despite claiming to be outnumbered, Stuart said his forces led by Fitz Lee, Colonel Laurence S. Baker (filling in for Rooney Lee), and Chambliss drove the Yankees back into the village. At this point, Stuart said it became evident that the Federals were bringing up reinforcements so he ordered a withdrawal toward Funkstown. Artillery fire from Colonel Robert P. Chew’s five guns effectively blocked any Federal chance to engage the retreating Confederates. Darkness ended fighting that had lasted most of the day. The Confederate cavalry bivouacked at Funkstown that night and spent a quiet day on the ninth. Union forces attacked on July 10 and another day of fighting on foot ensued. Seeing that his right flank was in jeopardy, Stuart pulled back to the west side of Antietam Creek, ending the day’s fighting. All was quiet on July 11 as the enemy made no movement toward Stuart’s forces. Back at Williamsport, Imboden had sent all the prisoners across the river on July 9 and what was left of the entire army north of the Potomac was dug in ready to protect the wagon train. At Falling Waters, a new pontoon bridge was being readied to carry troops, horses, and artillery across the river. On July 12, Union General George Meade’s command staff voted against an attack against the position. Meade changed his mind two days later, but it was too late. The night of the thirteenth was chosen for crossing the Potomac with the cavalry serving as a rear guard. Longstreet and A. P. Hill’s corps crossed at Falling Waters while Fitz Lee’s cavalry protected their rear. Longstreet’s column went first and was followed by the Confederate cavalry, who thought Hill had already crossed. Federal cavalry interfered with Hill’s subsequent crossing, and, because they were not recognized as the enemy, inflicted damage including mortally wounding Brigadier General James Pettigrew of North Carolina. Stuart’s column crossed at the Williamsport ford with all Confederates south of the river by 8 a.m. on July 14. The heroic actions by Imboden and Stuart at Hagerstown and Williamsport on July 6 delayed the Union cavalry’s advance on the Confederate column. They also allowed Stuart to buy more time with his stubborn fighting at Boonsboro on July 8 and Funkstown on July 10. Historians and writers are quick to criticize Stuart for what they deemed his late arrival at Gettysburg. Never mind that the epic battle was almost an all-infantry and artillery affair, and that Lee had two cavalry brigades with him on July 1. Stuart fought the Union cavalry to standoffs on July 2 at Hunterstown and July 3 at Gettysburg’s East Cavalry Field. There is little doubt that his cavalry performance during the retreat to the Potomac allowed the Confederate army to leave Pennsylvania and Maryland with enough firepower and supplies to continue the war for almost two more years. [Except for the last paragraph, this article is based on the Official Records, diaries, and letters relating to July 6, 1863, events of in and around Hagerstown and Williamsport, Md., as the Confederate army struggled to cross the Potomac River. There is no doubt other important documents exist that add to the engagements between the forces]

Among the Confederate wounded who safely crossed the Potomac at Williamsport were the author’s great grandfather and a great uncle. It is not clear when either crossed, by judging by the date his great grandfather reached a military hospital in far-away Danville, Va., he had to have been one of the lucky ones to cross early. Sell has written two books about his ancestors at Gettysburg and another about Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart. Sell can be reached at sellcarl@aol. com or 703-971-4716.