Clippings from the Past

By Stephen Davis · Originally published April 2019 · pp. 11–13

This article, “Atlanta and Nashville,” is in the Augusta Constitutionalist of February 5, 1865. It is signed “G. W. Y.” On the 7th the paper issued a correction, “G. W. Y. should have been G. W. S.,” leading us to conclude that the author was Gustavus W. Smith, who was living in Augusta at the time. General Smith was John Bell Hood’s distant cousin, whom Hood visited in early February as he passed through Augusta on his way to Richmond after his resignation from army command. We believe Hood was already writing his report of the Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns, and may have shown a draft of it to Smith, or at least talked with him about its contents. Together the two men apparently decided upon planting this article in the Southern press as a means of conveying Hood’s narrative of events. As such it is very one-sided and self-serving for Hood, but it is possibly the clearest and most succinct articulation of his viewpoint in print. We therefore present it in full, for the first time, we think, in the historical literature. The “G. W. Y. article” was reprinted in the Richmond Sentinel of Feb. 17, 1865, which is the text reproduced here. From the Augusta Constitutionalist, Feb. 5.

Atlanta and Nashville. Generals are often deprived of commands by the chief executive officers of their country, because public opinion sometimes demands it, and it may be that the Executive is opposed to the plans of the General. Sometimes they are not properly supported by the government and retire from the service, satisfied that others who are more fortunate in possessing the confidence and good will of the Executive, would be far more likely to achieve success in war. At other times generals voluntarily retire from commands, although strongly supported by both the government and their own army, because public opinion is expressed through the newspapers severely censuring the plans and movements devised by them. General Bragg commanded the army of Tennessee lying in front of the enemy at Chattanooga, covering Atlanta. The army was in great part opposed to him; the press and the people were opposed to him. His removal was demanded. The President yielded to this after a long struggle; Bragg was removed and Joseph E. Johnston assigned to the command. About the 7th of May Sherman advanced upon Johnston then lying at Dalton. It is conceded by all that Johnston’s army at that time was in the highest effective fighting condition in every respect. After Polk joined him, the army numbered about 65,000 effective men. Johnston on the 14th of July had been forced back across the Chattahoochee, having lost all of North Georgia, and over 20,000 of his men without bringing on a general engagement. The spirit of the army was almost ruined by constantly retiring—always on the defensive, fatigued almost beyond endurance by digging trenches for personal security, its morale was not only badly injured—it was almost lost. The enemy holding their own in numbers, were every day becoming more energetic and defiant.—When Johnston crossed the Chattahoochee, beaten back to the very suburbs of Atlanta, he was relieved of his command by Mr. Davis, and General Hood was placed in command of the army on the 18th of July.—Never, probably, was a young officer promoted and assigned to the command of any army under more difficult and trying circumstances. We are informed that General Hood has been relieved of the command at his own request. This, no doubt, was caused by the fact that the press and the people were censuring his operations with great severity, calling loudly upon the Executive to replace General Johnston [SIC Hood], and fast creating in the minds of all his sick and absent soldiers as well as upon many subordinate officers and privates in his army, the impression that Hood is a good fighter but has no head. The enemy, too, join in depreciating his capacity as a military leader. This may be for a purpose, as well as they may be especially meaning in the violent opposition manifested towards this young General by certain parties in our own country. Before entering upon the following statement of facts and opinions, it is proper to state the writer of this article is no friend of

Jefferson Davis. Hood took command of the army near Atlanta on the 18th of July. He immediately changed the policy of the campaign from the defensive to the active offensive. On the 20th, he attacked the enemy in position, and if Hardee’s corps had executed the part assigned to it, what was only a partial success, would have resulted in a complete victory. This, Hardee himself admitted, and stated that he could not get his orders obeyed. Again, on the 22d, Hood attacked the enemy and the partial success of Hardee demonstrated conclusively, what the result would have been had Hardee executed the orders given him by General Hood, by which he was required to completely turn the position of the enemy—if to do this he should have to march as far as Decatur or even beyond. The fortifications of Atlanta were of little if any strength, at the time Hood took command of the army, and the position was by nature very far from being advantageous—still he held Sherman at bay for more than forty days, twice during that time attacked and would have beaten the enemy had his orders been executed. This was the state of affairs on the 30th of August. Hood lost during this time less than seven thousand men, but not one inch of ground. His army in the meanwhile was regaining much of its former spirit and morale. Nothing could as yet be said against Hood’s practical generalship. Johnston in seventy days had lost the strongly fortified position between Dalton, all the strong defensible positions between Dalton and Atlanta, and with them all North Georgia—he had lost more than twenty thousand men, and the fighting spirit of his army had been materially impaired—so far certainly there was nothing to indicate that Johnston in his campaign showed any superiority over Hood. On the 30th of August, Hardee, with his own corps and that of Lee’s, was ordered to attack that portion of the enemy which had crossed Flint river, in the direction of Jonesboro.’ He was ordered not to cross the Flint river for the purpose of attacking, but on his arrival to attack and beat back whatever forces he might find between Flint river and the Macon and Atlantic railroad. The enemy had two small corps in position. Had they been badly beaten, it was supposed that Sherman would move to their support, and leave his fortifications, thus enabling Hood, with a large portion of the forces under Hardee, and Stewart’s corps from Atlanta, to strike between Sherman’s army and the river, without having to strike his strong fortifications, which already extended from the river to West Point railroad. The fact was impressed upon General Hardee that upon the success or failure of this attack depended the fate of Atlanta. Hardee had more men on the decisive point than Sherman had. His attack failed most signally. Our troops, after a short contest, retired from the field, with a loss of only about 1,400 men in the two corps. Thus, for the third time, was Atlanta played for and lost. Every time the orders of the commanding general were right, and the want of success was due to failure in their execution. At least such are known to be the opinions of Lieutenant General Stewart and Lieutenant General Lee, and other separate commanders under Gen. Hood. The complete failure of Hardee’s attack at Jonesboro, placed Sherman’s army in position to destroy Macon and Columbus, and release 34,000 prisoners at Andersonville, turning them loose to incite rebellion amongst the slaves in Southwest Georgia, leaving the women and children, the non-combatants and the property of all that section a prey to the released prisoners, and

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18 Broadway Malverne, NY 11565 Store: 516-593-3516 Cell: 516-353-3250 [email protected] http://www.vincaponi.com negroes, acting at their instigation. To prevent this Hood had to place his army between Sherman and Macon. Atlanta had, therefore, to be evacuated. But its fall is not fairly attributable to want of capacity and military ability on the part of Hood. Immediately after Hood took his new position at Lovejoy’s, Sherman retired to Atlanta, thus clearly proving that the enemy was not at that time in condition to continue the contest any further. This was the first retrograde movement forced upon his [sic him] between Dalton and Lovejoy’s. Sherman commenced to fortify Atlanta for permanent occupation, and he proclaimed that through this “Gate City” he would subdue and hold all Georgia. The first great problem for General Hood to solve was how best to prevent this. Let any man in Georgia, be he soldier or not, ask himself what would have been the probable result had Hood fortified his position, and awaited Sherman’s preparations and reinforcements? Had he done this, in all human probability the enemy would at this time not only have held Atlanta and all North Georgia, but Macon, Columbus, Augusta and Savannah would have been taken and strongly fortified, with lines of communication in every direction made perfectly secure by works which the enemy knew perfectly well how to construct, and garrisoned in such way that their power would have been fastened upon us. North Georgia is ours. The enemy have given up the almost impregnable fortifications which they constructed at Atlanta.—‘Tis true, they occupy the city of Savannah, but that port was closed to us already.— He marched through the State, but did not conquer and could not hold it. Who compelled Sherman to abandon Atlanta and left him to choose only between the sea coast, or retiring into Tennessee? Gen. Hood believed that if he acted strictly upon the defensive, the enemy, strengthened and reinforced as all knew he soon would be, could compel him at any time to fall back, and this policy would inevitably result in the ultimate loss of the whole State by piecemeal. There was still another and very serious consideration which induced him to assume the active offensive, one which no commander can safely disregard. The morale and esprit de corps of the best army in the world can be ruined by retreating and digging. No one understands this better than General Hood. The public mind was prepared for the fall of Atlanta when Johnston’s army crossed the Chattahoochee.—But after Hood had succeeded in holding the place for more than a month, they seem to have concluded he could and ought to hold it forever. When it did fall, with [sic without] stopping to inquire into the causes, he was at once charged with incompetency by the press; and this was so general and oft repeated as to cause serious doubts in the minds of many of his men in regard to his capacity as a leader. Hood had two objects in view; one was to get Sherman’s army out of the stronghold of Atlanta, the other to bring the army back to the highest point and spirit which it possessed in the beginning of the campaign at Dalton. He, therefore, determined to take the initiative, and moved upon Sherman’s rear, destroying thirty miles of his railroad communication between Marietta and and [sic] Tunnel Hill. This compelled Sherman to withdraw his main army to the vicinity of Dalton.—Hood then moved by way of Gadsden to the Tennessee river, intending to cross in the vicinity of Gunter’s Landing, which would have forced Sherman to withdraw into Middle Tennessee. Before crossing, Hood considered it necessary to have the assistance and co operation of the great cavalry leader of the West for the protection of the trains of his army. By some mischance the orders to General Forrest did not reach him in time. This rendered it necessary for Hood to move his army to Florence, in order to effect the required junction with Forrest. This movement caused sufficient delay to enable Sherman to repair his railroad, and crowd through from Nashville provisions sufficient to enable him to move from Atlanta to the coast with a large portion of his army. But for this compulsory movement of Hood upon Florence, Sherman could not have placed in Atlanta provisions enough to have justified his attempt to move a large force from this point to the coast. Sherman promptly availed himself of the opportunity, pushed provisions into Atlanta, divided his army and commenced his movement through Georgia. Gen Hood had then to decide which portion of this divided army he would attack. To turn back and pursue Sherman in Georgia would in the minds of his soldiers have been a compulsory retreat. They were by this time fully up to the highest fighting standard. A large portion of his army were Tennesseeans, and as seeming retreat without a fight might well have produced a very depressing effect upon the army. Besides, Hood knew that Sherman had barely sufficient provisions with which to make the march to the coast and a very short supply of ammunition. He therefore inferred that Sherman would not stop to besiege the fortified cities of Georgia before reaching the coast and that a march through the State, beyond damage to railroads, would produce no important military result. Thomas had in Tennessee the smaller portion of Sherman’s army. If Hood could not beat that he had a poor chance for coming up with and beaten [sic beating] Sherman. Thomas beaten, Nashville in our possession, the road to the Ohio river would be open, and Sherman would not be able to remain in the swamps of the Southern coast, with Hood’s army largely increased by recruits from Tennessee and Kentucky on the Ohio river, threatening the heart of the Northern country. Hood, for these reasons, determined to attack Thomas—moreover, he believed if he attacked Thomas and failed—it would be better than to have Thomas to follow him either into Alabama or Georgia without a battle. Certainly in his mind, it was better than having the combined armies of Sherman and Thomas, with uninterrupted railroad communications behind them slowly and surely fastening their hold upon all the vital points in the interior of Georgia, which he could not have prevented by acting upon the defensive. In his opinion the only possible way of preventing this result, was to possess himself of the railroad between Atlanta and Nashville. We have yet to examine the question, how the campaign against Thomas was conducted by Hood from Florence. He moved upon Columbia, (and forcing the enemy to abandon it,) turning the fortified position of Pulaski. They crossed Duck river and took position upon the north bank and fortified themselves. Hood crossed higher up, and succeeded in gaining position near their line of communications at Spring Hill. The reason why this masterly and successive movement did not result in the destruction or capture of eighteen thousand of the enemy’s infantry, and all their artillery and trains, is well known in Hood’s army, and it is not necessary to allude to it further. The soldiers who were there know well whose head conceived and caused the movement to be executed, and who failed to inflict the fatal blow when all was ready prepared for it. The enemy, after making this narrow escape, retreated rapidly to Franklin. Captured dispatches indicated that the enemy contemplated fortifying Franklin, and holding the line of Franklin and Murfreesboro’. It being inexpedient to attempt a flank movement, and this being the last chance to crush the enemy before he could reach the strong fortifications at Nashville, it was necessary to attack as soon as the troops could be put in position. The courage and conduct of the army in this fiercely contested struggle proved, beyond a doubt, that its old fighting spirit was restored, and stands in marked contrast with the conduct of the same troops at Jonesboro.’ After this decisive victory, Hood pushed forward to Nashville and fortified his position for the purpose of cutting off Thomas’ army from the garrisons of Murfreesboro, Knoxville and Chattanooga, thus forcing him to abandon these fortified positions, giving up that whole section of the country, or coming out to attack Hood in position.—Thomas did attack, and whilst all was going on well along Hood’s whole line, one division unaccountably gave way, which resulted in the retreat of the whole line in disorder.—In this struggle before Nashville, Hood was beaten by a giving way of a division—producing an almost immediate panic which could not be remedied. Notwithstanding the confusion and disorder, in which the troops left the field, they were soon rallied, and though the enemy made a vigorous pursuit, the army with its material safely crossed the Tennessee river—and the campaign ended. This was not the first offensive campaign attempted by us during the war. Lee has made two, one into Maryland, ending with the battle of Sharpsburg; another into Pennsylvania, which culminated in defeat at Gettysburg. What great results were gained by either? Hood is charged with being a reckless fighter. In his record there is no Malvern Hill, or any approach to the like of it. It is no part of the present purpose to criticize General Lee’s military operations, or comment upon the mistakes or misfortunes of the leader battling so courageously in the suburbs of the Capital of the Confederacy. Lee is, above all others, the favorite General, both with the Executive and the people, has been vested with almost plenary powers in regard to officers, men and materials, and stands first in the estimation of the armies of the country. Notwithstanding all this, there are those of high position competent and proper judges, too, who know Hood best, and are acquainted with the facts connected with his campaign, who believe that Hood in high capacity for active offensive war and characteristics of a great General, is fully equal to Lee himself—and that when their campaigns are made the subject of fair military criticism, the facts in regard to those known, the records will show that not only in tangible and advantageous results, but in management and generalship Hood’s will compare favorably with either of Lee’s. It is true that some of the railroads in Georgia have been broken up by the enemy. But suppose Hood had not made his movement upon Sherman’s rear, and had allowed the combined armies of Sherman and Thomas, with railroad communications uninterrupted between Nashville and Atlanta, to move upon Central and Southern Georgia.—The chances all are those that the whole of Georgia would have been occupied by the enemy. But whatever may be the differences of opinion in regard to Hood’s capacity, his management of the campaign and its results, the army under him, after all its hardships, fatigues and battles, has returned in fine spirits and effective condition, and may all be justly proud of their achievements, saving only the unfortunate few who, in an evil moment, gave way, or failed to do what was justly and fairly expected of them. When Lieutenant General Stewart, Lieutenant General Lee, Major General Forrest, and other commanders under Hood, express their unqualified conviction that the campaign failed in producing all the great results which could have been expected under the most favorable circumstances, not from any mistake upon the part of their general, it is not unreasonable to ask the press and the people not to condemn, at least until they know something of the facts. The sentiments of a commander, and the officers and men of an army, are certainly better judges of the capacity of their leader than outsiders, be they presidents, legislators, soldiers, citizens, correspondents, or editors. G. W. Y.