Roundtable News — May 2018

Originally published May 2018 · p. 9

CHICAGO, Ill.—Professor Larry Hewitt engaged The Chicago Civil War Round Table at its 769th Regular Meeting on Feb. 23, 2018, on Confederate General Richard Heron Anderson. Not a household name, even in Roundtable circles, Hewitt places him in the top echelon of Lee’s generals. Born into a prominent South Carolina family, Anderson attended West Point, graduating 40th in the Class of 1842 with other cadets who would play prominent roles in Lee’s army. He served on the frontier, in the Mormon War, and in the battles for Mexico City, and was later wounded fighting abolitionist elements in Kansas. Anderson resigned from the U.S. Army shortly after South Carolina seceded and was commissioned colonel of the 1st South Carolina Infantry. He served under General Beauregard at Charleston and succeeded him after Fort Sumter surrendered. Promoted to brigadier general on July 19, 1861, he assumed command of Charleston until reassigned to Pensacola where he was wounded during the Battle of

Santa Rosa Island in Oct. 1861. Anderson joined General Joseph Johnston’s army at Manassas in February 1862, then transferred to the Peninsula. Longstreet gave Anderson two brigades with instructions to defend the fortifications at Williamsburg. Despite having no maps, Anderson occupied Fort Magruder on the main road. When the fort came under fire, Anderson, outgunned as well as outnumbered, attacked and drove the Federals, saving the army’s trains and artillery. Anderson was cited for “signal gallantry and coolness,” but historians found him lacking. Hewitt defends Anderson on the charge that he ‘left the field,’ citing specific examples of Anderson’s actions during crucial stages of the battle when some said he was lost. At Seven Pines, Anderson distinguished himself and earned commendation from his superiors. But Hewitt pointed out how on current maps of the Seven Days Anderson’s name does not appear albeit he was commanding numerous brigades. Despite this neglect, he earned the name

‘Fighting Dick Anderson’ for his efforts during these battles and was eventually promoted to major general at Lee’s urging. Hewitt surmises that Anderson’s disdain for paperwork may have contributed to his relative obscurity; he wrote no battle reports for Seven Pines or Glendale. Anderson was scapegoated by historians for actions at Second Manassas, but Lee showed him support by enlarging his command. At Sharpsburg, he was seriously wounded, contributing to the collapse at the Sunken Road. He performed with distinction at Chancellorsville, where he entrenched and faced four Union corps. After five days of fighting, the Federals retreated, causing General Lee to cite Anderson for “promptness, courage and skill.” He followed with a poor performance at Gettysburg where Mahone’s brigade failed to attack on July 2, Hewitt’s observes. Anderson is best known for his actions at Spotsylvania following elevation to temporary corps command after Longstreet’s wounding. Ordered to march, Anderson’s quick movement blocked the Federal move to Spotsylvania and saved Lee’s army. Most historians have promoted a myth that Anderson was told to rest his troops but found no suitable place and kept marching, but Hewitt maintains his “soldierly spirit” instinctively caused him to march all night. Later, in the Shenandoah Valley during September 1864, although vastly outnumbered, he saved his command with an audacious maneuver and held the field at Berryville. Anderson returned to Petersburg for the remainder of the war. After the Federal breakthrough on April 1865, he commanded the rear guard. Hewitt described the intricate moves of the retreat at Sailor’s Creek where part of Lee’s army was captured. The road blocked, his wagons threatened, and the Union army pushing hard, Anderson decided to fight, but Gordon’s command moved away, leaving Anderson’s rear exposed. Initially successful, the attack failed, and Anderson’s command was routed. Hewitt considers Lee and others to have been responsible for this debacle, but Lee relieved Anderson. Hewitt argues that Lee favored Gordon for corps command, making Anderson vulnerable. Hewitt posits that a great general must be judged by his willingness to fight, and fight Dick

Anderson did. Other than Stonewall Jackson, few of Lee’s generals were more aggressive or successful. Still, Anderson remains neglected. Larry Hewitt intends to change this. For more information on the Chicago Civil War Roundtable visit http://www.chicagocwrt.org Meetings are held at: Holiday Inn O’Hare, 5615 N. Cumberland, Chicago, IL 60631 Please make your reservation in advance by emailing DinnerReservations@ChicagoCWRT. org with the names of your party or by calling (630) 460-1865.

Lieut. Gen. Richard Heron Anderson.